How & Why Google Glass Failed

谷歌眼镜为何失败

2020-03-08 11:17:52 Investopedia

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Amidst the lightning rollout of fashionable, utilitarian merchandise, we think some products emerge out of the ether into our hands in the blink of an eye. This is no deception—it’s a kind of magic. Experimentation is required for any successful product deployment. All the same, evolution is often out of reach or hidden behind the scenes. Since 2010, Google (GOOG) X, a fairly secretive initiative started by Sebastian Thrun, has attempted to improve life and commodities by a factor of 10, rather than ten percent, through efforts called moonshots. Project Glass was assembled by virtue of these ambitions. Viewed as a vehicle for future technology, the MIT Technology Review comments that “Glass is already miles from where it was in 2011.” In fact, the invention, which was merely a shot in the dark, has taken on an afterlife of its own. Google became caught up in the storm of its own making when it marketed Glass. The company wanted to capitalize on the hype, hope, and potential of the product instead of selling the reality. Rather than promoting the product as “a prototype technology from the future” as initially intended, “the promotion and high price of Glass simply gave it the allure of a super-premium product.” Google Glass wasn’t coming to save the world, just help it. In fact, the central dispute among members of Google X was whether Glass should be used as a “fashionable device” all the time or “only for specific utilitarian functions.” Drawing inspiration from John F. Kennedy’s understanding that bigger challenges create more passion, specifically in regards to the space race, Google development ultimately strove to integrate feedback into its system. To do this, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, who also oversees Google X, suggested Glass be treated as a finished product, despite everyone in the lab knowing it was “a prototype, with major kinks to be worked out.” Brin wanted to release Glass to the public and have consumers provide feedback that Google X could then use to improve the design. The Glass prototype was released early as a result, with the intention of being more forward-looking than expressly convenient. Tim Brown, CEO and president of IDEO, feels the effort was not in vain, stating, “There has never in the history of new technology been an example where the first version out of the gate has been the right version.” Ultimately, although consumers want wearable technology, the functionality needs to be palatable. As Slate notes, “Glass’ problem is that the technology today simply doesn’t offer anything that average people really want, let alone need, in their everyday lives.” Glass is an interesting idea: it is nice to look at, but not through. Google originally advertised Glass in terms of experience augmentation. The 2012 demo reel featured skydiving, biking, as well as wall scaling. Eventually, the videos showed user-friendly information instantaneously appearing on-screen during everyday activities. Google’s aspirations were lofty: the technology required lengthy battery life, improved image-recognition capabilities, and a lot of data. Rather than augment reality, Glass simply supplemented it. The two to three-hour battery life enabled users to check messages, view photos, and search the Internet. Glass was competing with other devices that boasted superior cameras, larger capacity, and faster processors. With Glass’s questionable value came many questions. Would users be comfortable wearing a camera around their faces every day? As the MIT Technology Review points out, “no one could understand why you’d want to have that thing on your face, in the way of normal social interaction.” Others were less comfortable being on the other side of the Glass. Some bars and restaurants barred wearers entry; several simply banned the device altogether. The device’s outrageous valuation and creepy hazards even led to the creation of a brand-new pejorative. Furthermore, the device retailed for $1,500 and didn’t do any single action especially well, which is why those who could afford Glass were content with cutting-edge smartphones. In pricing Glass high and limiting access to a specific community of Glass Explorers, Google simply emphasized division “between the haves and have-nots.” People spend egregious sums on luxury items, but they find value with identity. Google Glass seems to be lacking in the department. Superficially, yet crucially, the device isn’t cool. Google then tried to associate the product with fashion designers. Glass was featured during Fashion Week and in relevant advertisements. In other words, the company tried to buy coolness. However, the coolness associated with an invention assumes the element of faith—the brand is trustworthy. The Harvard Business Review puts it best: “Cool is not an equation. It’s mysterious, ineffable. An art, not a science.” Art isn’t easy in technology.
在时尚实用商品的闪电般推出中,我们认为有些产品在眨眼之间从乙醚中浮现出来。这不是欺骗——这是一种魔法。任何成功的产品部署都需要进行实验。同样的,进化往往是遥不可及或隐藏在幕后的。 自2010年以来, Sebastian Thrun 发起的一项相当隐秘的计划 Google ( GOOG ) X 试图通过所谓的“登月”努力,将生活和商品的价格提高10%,而不是10%。玻璃工程是由于这些野心而组装起来的. 《麻省理工学院技术评论》( MIT Technology Review )认为,玻璃是未来技术的一种载体,它评论称,“玻璃距离2011年的位置已经很远了。”事实上,这只是一次在黑暗中拍摄的发明,已经经历了它自己的余生。 谷歌在销售玻璃时陷入了自己制造的风暴。该公司希望利用产品的宣传、希望和潜力,而不是销售现实。而不是像最初设想的那样,将产品推广为“未来的原型技术”,玻璃的推广和高价只是给了它超级优质产品的吸引力。 谷歌眼镜并不是来拯救世界,只是帮助它。事实上,谷歌 X 成员之间的核心争议是,玻璃是否应该一直作为“时尚设备”使用,还是“仅用于特定的实用功能”。 约翰· F ·肯尼迪( John F . Kennedy )的理解给出了灵感,即更大的挑战会带来更多的激情,特别是在太空竞赛方面,谷歌的发展最终会努力将反馈融入其系统。 为了做到这一点,谷歌联合创始人谢尔盖•布林( Sergey Brin )建议将 Glass 视为一种成品,尽管实验室里的每个人都知道它是“一个原型,主要的问题有待解决”。布林希望向公众发布玻璃,并让消费者提供反馈,谷歌 X 可以用来改进设计。 因此,玻璃原型被提前发布,其目的是更具前瞻性而不是明确的方便。IDEO 首席执行官兼总裁蒂姆•布朗( Tim Brown )认为,这一努力并不是徒劳的,他说:“在新技术的历史上,从来没有出现过这样一个例子:第一个版本是正确的。” 最终,尽管消费者希望使用可穿戴技术,但这些功能需要令人赏心悦目。正如 Slate 所指出的,“玻璃”的问题是,如今的科技根本不能提供人们日常生活中真正想要、更不用说需要的东西。”玻璃是一个有趣的想法:看起来很好,但不是通过。 谷歌最初在经验增强方面宣传玻璃。2012年的演示卷轴的特点是跳伞,自行车,以及墙壁伸缩。最终,视频显示用户友好的信息即时出现在屏幕上的日常活动。谷歌的抱负是远大的:这项技术需要长时间的电池寿命、改进的图像识别能力以及大量数据。 而不是增强现实,玻璃只是补充了它。两到三个小时的电池寿命使用户能够检查信息,查看照片,并搜索互联网。玻璃与其他拥有卓越摄像头、更大容量和更快处理器的设备竞争。 由于格拉斯的价值值得怀疑,许多人提出了疑问。用户会不会每天都穿着摄像头?正如麻省理工学院技术评论所指出的,“没有人能理解为什么你想要在你的脸上,以正常的社会交往的方式。” 另一些人则不太舒服地呆在玻璃的另一边。一些酒吧和餐馆禁止穿戴者进入,有几家干脆完全禁止这种装置。该设备令人愤怒的估值和令人毛骨悚然的危险,甚至导致了一种全新的贬损。 此外,这款设备的零售价为1500美元,而且没有采取任何一种特别好的行动,这就是为什么买得起玻璃的人满足于尖端智能手机。在给玻璃定价时,谷歌只强调了“富人和穷人之间”的划分,并限制了特定的玻璃探索者群体。 人们在奢侈品上花费惊人的钱,但他们发现有价值的身份。谷歌眼镜似乎缺乏在该部门。从表面上看,但关键的是,该设备并不酷。 谷歌随后试图将该产品与时尚设计师联系起来。在时装周和相关广告中都有玻璃。换句话说,公司试图购买凉爽。 然而,与一项发明相关的凉爽假定了信念的元素——品牌是值得信赖的。《哈佛商业评论》( Harvard Business Review )最好地指出:“酷不是一个方程。这是神秘的,无法形容的。艺术,而不是科学。”艺术在技术上并不容易。

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